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2024, 06, v.37 56-61
休谟的认识辩护理论初探
基金项目(Foundation): 国家社会科学基金重大项目“西方百年元伦理学史研究”(19ZDA036)
邮箱(Email):
DOI: 10.13388/j.cnki.ysaj.2024.06.016
摘要:

休谟的认识论中包含了一些传统的认识辩护思想,其认识辩护思想是围绕着以下三个问题展开的:第一,什么是信念?第二,我们可以拥有哪几种认识辩护?第三,我们的物理信念是如何得到认识辩护的?在解答了这三个问题的基础上,休谟最终否定了我们的物理信念获得认识辩护的可能性。虽然休谟的认识辩护思想不可避免地存在着所有传统认识辩护理论普遍会有的问题,但是,它依然是当代认识论的探讨所绕不开的一个部分。

Abstract:

There is a traditional theory on epistemic justification in Hume's epistemology. This theory focus on three questions: Firstly, what is belief? Secondly, how many kinds of justification can we have? Thirdly, how do our beliefs about physical objects get their justification? After answering these questions, it denies that our beliefs about physical objects can be justified. There are some traditional problems on his theory, but there is no doubt that his idea is an important scour of contemporary theories on epistemic justification.

参考文献

[1]休谟.人性论[M].关文运,译,郑之骧,校.北京:商务印书馆,2012.

[2]SKENE M.Seemings and The Possibility of Epistemic Justification[J].Philosophy Study,2013(163):542.

[3]波伊曼.知识论导论:我们能知道什么?[M].洪汉鼎,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2008:296.

[4]LEHRER K.Theory of Knowledge[M].Boulder,CO:Westview Press,1990:73.

[5]POLLOCK J,CRUZ J.Contemporary Theories of Knowledge[M].Second Edition.New York:Rowman Littlefield Publishers,1999:33.

[6]FUMERTON R.Theories of Justification[M]//MOSER P.The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology.Oxford:Oxford University Press,2002:214.

基本信息:

DOI:10.13388/j.cnki.ysaj.2024.06.016

中图分类号:B561.291

引用信息:

[1]赵国锋.休谟的认识辩护理论初探[J].阴山学刊,2024,37(06):56-61.DOI:10.13388/j.cnki.ysaj.2024.06.016.

基金信息:

国家社会科学基金重大项目“西方百年元伦理学史研究”(19ZDA036)

发布时间:

2024-11-20

出版时间:

2024-11-20

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